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WHERE IS THE ACAA TODAY? TRACING THE LAW




WAILE THE AIRLINE industry in the United States has
been deregulated, it is far from being unregulated. The
federal government has specifically regulated the way in which
airlines accommodate the needs of handicapped and disabled
passengers. The focus of the federal government's effort is
found in the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Air Car-
rier Access Act of 1986 (ACAA). Now that the ACAA has been
in effect for more than a decade and a half, a sufficient number
of judicial decisions flesh out the implementation of the ACAA
to allow for a useful discussion of its development. The follow-
ing discussion traces the ACAA from its inception to the pre-
sent, touching on all the issues the courts have addressed,
organized in a simple and straightforward format. It provides
answers to how the ACAA came about, whom it benefits, what
benefits are created, and who must provide those benefits.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ACAA
The Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 (ACAA)' has a heritage
which traces all the way back to the Federal Aviation Act of
1958.2 Section 404 of the Federal Aviation Act had two perti-
nent passages: under section 404(a) (1), air carriers must "pro-
vide safe and adequate service, equipment, and facilities;" under
section 404(b) air carriers must not "subject any particular per-
* Mr. Strawinski is in private practice in Atlanta, Georgia, where he specializes
in litigation relating to all aspects of aviation and aviation insurance.
I Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. §§ 41310, 41501, 41702, 41705
(Supp. IV 1986).
2 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374 (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1141
(1994).
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son.., to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasona-
ble prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." First,
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), then later, the Department
of Transportation (DOT), promulgated regulations under sec-
tion 404(a) (1) providing for non-discriminatory treatment of
handicapped individuals by air carriers.' At the same time,
courts found a private cause of action in favor of handicapped
individuals against air carriers based on section 404(b).4
Additionally, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19735
provided as follows:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United
States, as defined in Section 706(8) of this Title, shall, solely by
reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance... 6
Because of this last phrase, the CAB was using Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act to regulate only those particular air oper-
ations that received federal subsidies for transporting mail and
passengers to small communities.7
The Airline Deregulation Act of 19788 (ADA) repealed sec-
tion 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, thereby eliminating the
main basis on which courts allowed a private cause of action for
discrimination by air carriers. So, by the early 1980s, disabled
passengers retained relatively few protections against perceived
discriminatory behavior of commercial airlines. In this context,
the ACAA owes its existence most directly to a single case: U.S.
Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America.9 In
that case, organizations representing handicapped people chal-
lenged the CAB's interpretation of section 504. They argued
that since all airlines received federal financial assistance in the
form of airport development programs and air traffic control
systems, that CAB ought to use section 504 to regulate all air
3 14 C.F.R. § 382, subpart A (1988).
4 Hingson v. Pac. S.W. Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1984); Nader
v. Allegheny Airlines, 512 F.2d 527, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds,
426 U.S. 290 (1976).
5 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
6 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
7 United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597,
600-01 (1986) [hereinafter DOT v. PVA].
8 49 U.S.C. App. § 1301, repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1141 (1994)
(current version at 49 U.S.C. § 4011).
9 DOT v. PVA, 477 U.S. at 606-07.
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carriers, as opposed to just those particular air carriers receiving
direct federal subsidies. The Supreme Court rejected that argu-
ment, agreeing with the CAB that section 504 did not apply to
air carriers generally.
Congress responded promptly by passing the Air Carrier Ac-
cess Act. The pertinent provisions of the ACAA, which are now
codified under 49 U.S.C. § 41705, are as follows:
§ 41705. Discrimination against handicapped individuals.
In general. - In providing air transportation, an air carrier, in-
cluding (subject to 40105(b)) any foreign air carrier, may not
discriminate against an otherwise qualified individual on the fol-
lowing grounds:
the individual has a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities.
the individual has a record of such an impairment.
the individual is regarded as having such an impairment.
Each act constitutes separate offense. - For purposes of section
46301 (a) (3) (E), a separate violation occurs under this section
for each individual act of discrimination prohibited by subsec-
tion (a).
Investigation of complaints. -
In general. - The Secretary shall investigate each complaint of a
violation of subsection (a).
Publication of data. - The Secretary shall publish disability-re-
lated complaint data in a manner comparable to other consumer
complaint data.
Review and report. - The Secretary shall regularly review all com-
plaints received by air carriers alleging discrimination on the ba-
sis of disability and shall report annually to congress on the
results of such review.
Technical assistance. - Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall -
implement a plan, in consultation with the Department of Jus-
tice, the United States Architectural and Transportation Barriers
Compliance Board, and the National Council on Disability, to
provide technical assistance to air carriers and individuals with
disabilities in understanding the rights and responsibilities set
forth in this section; and
ensure the availability and provision of appropriate technical as-
sistance manuals to individuals and entities with rights or respon-
sibilities under this section.'0
The ACAA began as 49 U.S.C. § 1374. It was recodified in
1994, and can now be found at 49 U.S.C. § 41705. Most re-
l0 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (1999).
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cently, it was amended on April 5, 2000, to increase its applica-
tion to foreign air carriers.''
The issue of whether the ACAA can be applied retroactively
has come up from time to time in the case law. In Anderson v.
USAir, Inc.,' 2 a blind attorney was inadvertently seated in an
emergency exit row. When he refused to move to a different
seat, he was arrested by an FAA police officer and taken off the
flight. The occurrence took place on February 6, 1985. As of
January 1, 1983, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 had re-
pealed section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act. Between the
time Anderson was argued and when it was decided, Congress
passed the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) on October 2, 1986.
Even though the plaintiff made no claim pursuant to the ACAA,
the court discussed the question of whether it could be applied
retroactively. Reasoning that "statutes affecting substantive
rights and liabilities are presumed to have only prospective ef-
fect," and finding no applicable exception to that rule, the court
held that the ACAA would not be applied retroactively. 13
In Squire v. United Airlines, Inc.,' 4 job applicants sought to re-
cover under the ACAA because they had been refused employ-
ment as flight officers due to the fact that they had received
radial keratotomy eye surgery. Following Anderson, the court
noted that the ACAA was passed on October 2, 1986, "well after
United's rejection of [the applicants'] applications." 15 The
court refused to apply the ACAA retroactively. 6
The "retroactivity" issue arose again after the ACAA was
amended on April 5, 2000, by the Wendell H. Ford Aviation In-
vestment and Reform Act for the Twenty-First Century. Alino v.
Aerovias De Mexico,'7 involved a paraplegic wheelchair-bound pas-
senger who alleged a violation of the ACAA when his confirmed
flight reservations were changed by the issuance of boarding
passes "subject to space" only. He was denied boarding for his
scheduled flight. The question of retroactive application of a
statute, in this case an amendment, was potentially critical be-
cause the amendment in question had expanded the applica-
11 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (1999), amended by Pub. L. No. 106-181, § 707(a) (2)
(2000).
12 818 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
13 Id.
14 973 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Colo. 1997).
15 Id. at 1009.
16 Id.
17 129 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
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tion of the ACAA to foreign air carriers such as the defendant.
On the surface, it would appear that since the occurrence took
place on January 3, 2000, and the amendment to the ACAA oc-
curred on April 5, 2000, that the amendment would not be ap-
plied retroactively. The court acknowledged the general
presumption against retroactivity, discussed above, but then
looked deeper. One exception to the general presumption oc-
curs when the legislation itself gives some indication of the legis-
lature's intent to apply it retroactively. In the "Reform Act" the
language indicates that "except as otherwise specifically pro-
vided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall apply
only to fiscal years beginning after September 30, 1999.' '1 s Rely-
ing on that expression of legislative intent, the court retroac-
tively applied the amended version of the ACAA.' 9
In Bower v. Federal Express Corp.,20 the court skirted the retroac-
tivity issue in a different manner. In that case, Richard A.
Bower, an employee of Federal Express Corporation, suffered
from spina bifida, requiring him to use leg braces and crutches.
Based on his disability, Federal Express denied him jumpseat
privileges, which were generally extended to employees. He
sought a recovery under the ACAA, forcing the court to address
the issue of which version of the ACAA applied. Shortly before
Bower filed suit, Congress recodified the ACAA. The recodifica-
tion contained language indicating that it was not intended to
effect any substantive change. Reasoning that the plaintiff was
attacking a Federal Express practice that was on-going at the
time he filed his complaint, the court concluded that the district
court had erred in applying the former version of the statute,
and held that the latter version of the statute should be uti-
lized.21 The opinion, however, does not identify any difference
in the outcome that results from selecting the recodified
version.
Over the years since passage of this legislation, the courts have
set about the task of answering those many questions that inevi-
tably arise regarding the proper construction of a new statute.
The following discussion aims to catalogue those issues that
have been addressed, noting the results and the reasoning, as
well as those issues that have not been resolved.
18 Id. at 1344.
19 Id.
20 96 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 1996).
21 Id. at 203.
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Only part of the impact of the ACAA flows directly from the
language of the statute itself. The full picture can only be un-
derstood by reference to the regulations promulgated to imple-
ment the ACAA. Those regulations are found at 14 C.F.R.
§ 382.
III. SCOPE OF REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING
THE ACAA
The combination of the ACAA and the regulations imple-
menting the ACAA constitutes a comprehensive collection of
rules governing the interaction between disabled passengers
and air carriers. The overall purpose is to prevent discrimina-
tion against handicapped individuals. To achieve that goal, the
regulations contain a general prohibition against discrimination
and a series of particular mandates ranging from general con-
cepts to specific details. In short, the regulations address virtu-
ally every aspect of the relationship between the disabled
passenger and the air carrier from the moment the passenger
contacts the air carrier. The ACAA regulates the relationship
when the passenger arrives at the airport parking lot, passes
through the terminal, undergoes security screening, is trans-
ported through the airport, waits in the gate area, goes through
the boarding process, is seated, and uses aircraft facilities during
flight. While there may be some aspect of the relationship that
is not regulated, it is not apparent.
IV. QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE ACAA
The ACAA is intended to benefit handicapped and disabled
individuals seeking non-discriminatory air transportation. Al-
though most of the cases construing the ACAA skip over the
step of determining whether the plaintiff is entitled to the bene-
fits of the statute, usually by a stipulation of the parties, it re-
mains a potential threshold issue. While the definition of a
qualified individual has undergone some evolution over the
years,2 2 today it is found in 14 C.F.R. § 382.5.23
22 In Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, 881 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1989), the court
directly addressed the question of whether Polly Tallarico was an "otherwise qual-
ified handicapped individual" pursuant to the regulations. Polly Tallarico was a
14-year-old child suffering from cerebral palsy, who desired to travel unaccompa-
nied. She could not walk, but she could crawl; she could not talk, but she could
communicate using various devices, and she could speak short words. She pos-
sessed normal intelligence and she could hear and understand the spoken word.
The ACAA requires the Secretary of Transportation "to promulgate regulations
390
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The Bower v. Federal Express Corp.24 opinion contained a
lengthy discussion of whether an employee (not a customer in
the normal sense) could fit the definition of "qualified handi-
capped individual." By the time the Bower case came along, the
regulations had been promulgated to implement the ACAA.
The critical regulation is found at 14 C.F.R. § 382.5, which con-
tains the following definition:
Qualified handicapped individual25 means an individual who -
With respect to accompanying or meeting a traveler, use of
ground transportation, using terminal facilities, or obtaining in-
formation about schedules, fares or policies, takes those actions
necessary to avail himself or herself of facilities or services of-
fered by an air carrier to the general public with reasonable ac-
commodations, as needed, provided by the carrier;
With respect to obtaining a ticket for air transportation on an air
carrier, offers, or makes a good faith attempt to offer, to
purchase or otherwise validly to obtain such a ticket;
With respect to obtaining air transportation, or other services or
accommodations required by this part:
Purchases or possesses a valid ticket for air transportation on an
air carrier and presents himself or herself in the airport for the
purpose of traveling on the flight for which the ticket has been
purchased or obtained; and
to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of qualified handicapped individuals."
At the time Tallarico was decided, no regulations had been promulgated pursuant
to the ACAA. The legislative history, however, directed the court to the defini-
tion contained in 14 C.F.R. § 382.3(c) (1988). That regulation contained the
following definition of "qualified handicapped person":
A handicapped individual (1) who tenders payment for air trans-
portation, (2) whose carriage will not violate Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) regulations, and (3) who is willing and able to
comply with reasonable safety requests of the airline personnel or,
if unable to comply, who is accompanied by a responsible adult pas-
senger who can ensure compliance with such a request.
Polly had clearly tendered payment for air transportation, and there was no rea-
son to think that her carriage would violate FAA regulations. The only question
discussed by the court was whether she was "willing and able to comply with rea-
sonable safety requests of the airline personnel." In concluding that she quali-
fied on this factor as well, the court relied on the evidence indicating that she was
able to understand, that she was able to move about independently, and that she
could communicate her own needs as well as understand the requests of the
crew. The court held that she fit the definition and that the ACAA applied. To-
day the definition is different and it can be found in 14 C.F.R. § 382.5 (2002).
23 See 14 C.F.R. § 382.5 (2002).
24 Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 206-10 (6th Cir. 1996).
25 Today the same regulation uses the term "qualified individual with a disabil-
ity" in place of "qualified handicapped individual" but the definition remains the
same. See 14 C.F.R. § 382.5 (2002).
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Meets reasonable, non-discriminatory contract of carriage re-
quirements applicable to all passengers26
The Sixth' Circuit'went to great lengths analyzing the "quali-
fied handicapped individual" definition. The court did not,
however, ultimately decide this issue, preferring instead, to refer
the issue back to the district court. Because of other procedural
issues, the district court never published an opinion directly
resolving the issue.27
Another case raises the question of whether a person's height
could qualify him or her as a "qualified handicapped individ-
ual." The Tall Club of Silicon Valley brought suit against Ameri-
can Airlines pursuant to the ACAA, seeking to enjoin the
airlines to reserve specific seating for persons who were so tall
that they needed extra leg room.28 The federal district court in
California remanded the case to the state court without reach-
ing the issue in question.
V. THE ACAA MAY CREATE A PRIVATE CAUSE
OF ACTION
Given the legislative history of the ACAA, having been created
in direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in DOT v.
PVA, 2 9 it should not be surprising that courts found that the
ACAA created a private cause of action. Tallarico v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.,3" was ihe first federal court of appeals opinion di-
rectly addressing that issue. Polly Tallarico suffered from cere-
bral palsy. Although she could not walk, she could use a
wheelchair and she could crawl. Although she could not talk
except for speaking short words, she could hear and she could
respond using a communication board, a memo writer, and a
"Minispeak."3 After she arrived at the airport for a flight from
Houston to St. Louis, unaccompanied, the airline determined
that it would be necessary for her to be accompanied. The in-
tended flight was on November 25, 1986, shortly after the enact-
ment of the ACAA.
26 14 C.F.R. § 382.5.
27 Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 678 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
28 Tall Club of Silicon Valley v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2000 WL 868524 (N.D. Cal.
filed June 19, 2000).
29 DOT v. PVA, 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
1o Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1989).
31 Id. at 568.
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The ACAA does not expressly create a private cause of action.
The question, then, becomes whether there is an implied private
cause of action under the ACAA. Both the Missouri District
Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the
analysis for making that determination is found in the case of
Cort v. Ash. 2 That test includes four factors that are set out as
follows:
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted,' that is, does the statute create a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a rem-
edy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? And, finally, is the cause of action one traditionally rel-
egated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States,
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?1
3
To determine whether Polly Tallarico was "one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, ' 34 the court ad-
dressed the question of whether she was an "otherwise qualified
handicapped individual" under the terms of the statute.3" The
statute did not contain a definition of that term, but the legisla-
tive history indicates that it was intended to be consistent with
the DOT's definition in 14 C.F.R. § 382.3(c) (1988). That defi-
nition has three parts. A "qualified handicapped person" is an
"individual (1) who tenders payment for air transportation, (2)
whose carriage will not violate Federal Aviation Administration
regulations, and (3) who is willing and able to comply with rea-
sonable safety requests of the airline personnel or, if unable to
comply, who is accompanied by a responsible adult passenger
who can ensure compliance with such a request. '3 6 Polly Tal-
liarco had tendered payment. Her carriage would not violate
any FAA regulations. Accordingly, the only real analysis under-
taken by the court was whether she was willing and able to com-
ply with reasonable safety requests. The jury, the trial court, and
the court of appeals all agreed that since she possessed normal
intelligence, could crawl from place to place, and was capable of
32 Id.; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
33 Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 568 (citing Cort, 422 U.S. at 78).
'14 Id. (emphasis added).
35 Id. at 569.
36 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 382.3(c) (1988)).
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communicating through various alternative methods, she fit the
definition of a "qualified handicapped person."
37
The court resolved the second Cort v. Ash factor by noting that
the implicit legislative intent was revealed in the fact that the
ACAA was a direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in
DOT v. PVA. 3 8 That case found that section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 applied only in an extremely limited fashion
to commercial airlines. The congressional record revealed legis-
lative history suggesting that the ACAA was created to prevent
discriminatory treatment of handicapped individuals by air car-
riers. For these reasons, the court found an implied intent to
create an implied cause of action."
The court also found that to allow a private cause of action
was consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme and that such a cause of action was not one traditionally
relegated to state law. In short, the Tallarico court found that
the ACAA provided a private cause of action.4 °
The same reasoning emanating from Cort v. Ash and Tallarico
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., was followed by the Fifth Circuit in
Shinault v. American Airlines, Inc.41 While the New Jersey District
Court in Waters v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey42 points
out that it is still unsettled whether 49 U.S.C. § 41310(a) (the
former § 404(a) of the FAA) provides a private cause of action,
it followed Tallarico and Shinault in holding that 49 U.S.C. §
41705(a) (ACAA) does create a private cause of action.
After it seemed that the issue was settled, the U.S. Supreme
Court handed down Alexander v. Sandoval,43 apparently clarify-
ing, or retreating from, the opinion in Cart v. Ash. In Sandoval
the Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, explained that the four factors to
be considered in Cort v. Ash are not all to be given the same
weight. The correct analysis is whether Congress intended to
create a private cause of action, and in that analysis the other
three factors are only to be used to help understand the clear
meaning of the statute's text.44
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 569-70.
40 Id. at 570.
41 Shinault v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 936 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1991).
42 Waters v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 158 F. Supp. 2d 415, 430-32 (D.NJ.
2001).
43 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
44 Id. at 287-88.
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Taking guidance from Cort v. Ash and Sandoval, one court
held that an air carrier's failure to have a Complaint Resolution
Officer present at all times, in violation of Section 382.65 of the
applicable regulations effecting the ACAA, did not "state a claim
upon which relief may be granted in the federal courts under
the ACAA. 4
5
While Sandoval was not an ACAA case, the Eleventh Circuit
followed Sandoval in deciding whether an implied private cause
of action was available under the ACAA. In Love v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc.,4 6 the district court considered Sandoval, but chose to
follow Tallarico in finding the existence of a private cause of ac-
tion under the ACAA. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. The Eleventh Circuit applied the analysis in Sandoval,
rather than Cort v. Ash, and concluded that Congress did not
intend to create a private cause of action when it enacted the
ACAA.47
Love is the most recent case on the issue, and it is grounded
on a perceived evolution of the United States Supreme Court's
holdings on implied private rights of action. So, while the Su-
preme Court has not addressed the issue in the context of the
ACAA, it seems that if there is to be a private cause of action
under the ACAA it will have to be the result of further legisla-
tion by Congress. Given the original legislative history of the
ACAA, it would not be surprising for Congress to address the
issue. Nonetheless, absent a reversal of Love by the Supreme
Court or new legislation by Congress, the following discussion of
particular rights under the ACAA may be only historical.
VI. THE ACAA MAY PROVIDE CERTAIN REMEDIES
Given the fact that the ACAA does not expressly provide a
private cause of action, and the fact that no particular remedies
are addressed in the ACAA, there are a number of cases in
which courts have been forced to address the question of exactly
which remedies are available to a private litigant.
Courts that determined, or assumed, that the ACAA provided
a private cause of action had no difficulty allowing compensa-
tory damages. 48 The most complete discussion of the develop-
45 Deterra v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 298, 312 (D. Mass. 2002).
46 Love v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 310 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002).
47 Id. at 1351, 1360.
48 See e.g., Shinault v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 936 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1991); Tallarico
v. Trans World Airlines, 881 F.2d 566, 570-71 (8th Cir. 1989); Am. Disabled for
3952003]
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ment of the rationale by which implied rights are identified
under federal statutes is found in Shinault. That discussion is
most aptly summarized by the following quote contained
therein: "The existence of the statutory right implies the exis-
tence of all necessary and appropriate remedies. '
Similarly, the courts have had little trouble recognizing a pri-
vate cause of action for emotional distress.5 0 There is one ex-
ception. The Utah district court, in Americans Disabled For
Accessible Public Transportation (ADAPT), Salt Lake Chapter v.
SkyWest Airlines, Inc.51 declined to follow Tallarico. Instead, it
found that the ACAA was to be read in pari materia with the Re-
habilitation Act.52 Since section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
did not provide for emotional distress damages, and since the
ACAA was viewed by this court to be simply an extension of sec-
tion 504 to include air carriers generally, the court concluded
that the ACAA did not provide for emotional distress damages.5 "
Since both the Eighth Circuit in Tallarico and the Fifth Circuit in
Shinault, held that emotional distress damages are available, it
seems that the weight of authority is on the side of allowing
emotional distress damages under the ACAA.
. Punitive damages, on the other hand, are another question.
Presently, no court has allowed for the recovery of punitive dam-
ages under the ACAA. At the same time, however, there is no
clear ruling that prohibits the recovery of punitive damages
under the ACAA. In Tallarico neither the district court nor the
court of appeals directly addressed the question of whether pu-
nitive damages would be allowed under the ACAA. Instead, they
both concluded that there was insufficient evidence of "oppres-
sion, malice, gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct, or
reckless disregard for the rights of the plaintiff'54 in order to
raise the issue.55 In SkyWest Airlines, Inc., the case that declined
to follow Tallarico, the court held that the ACAA clearly does not
Accessible Public Transp. v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 320 (D. Utah
1991).
49 Shinault, 936 F.2d at 804 (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229, 239 (1969)).
50 See id. at 803-05; Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 570.
51 SkyWest Airlines, 762 F. Supp. at 326-27.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 571.
55 Id. at 571-72.
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allow for punitive damages. 6 That court's, rationale, however,
may be questionable in light of the extent to which the circuit
courts are taking a different approach.
In Shinault, the district court held that punitive damages were
not recoverable under the ACAA. The court of appeals, in turn,
disagreed with the district court's reasoning, but declined to ad-
dress the issue of punitive damages because the plaintiff had not
alleged the type of conduct necessary to recover punitive dam-
ages. 57 More recently, in Rivera v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,58 the
Pennsylvania district court took the same approach. It avoided
the issue of whether punitive damages are available under the
ACAA because the plaintiff had not established the necessary
factual predicate to raise that issue.59
Similarly, the Vermont district court in Price v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc.60 made no direct ruling on the issue, leaving the door open
for the plaintiff to present additional evidence. In so doing, the
court observed that there is some precedent for a federal stan-
dard relating to the award of punitive damages for violating the
Federal Aviation Act. Punitive damages were found available
following proof of conduct evidencing "evil motive, actual mal-
ice, deliberate violence or oppression" in violation of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act's provisions prohibiting discrimination by air
61carriers.
In the most recent case of DeGirolamo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree
Italiane, S.p.A.,62 the New Jersey district court seemed to assume
that punitive damages are available under the ACAA. Without
directly addressing the issue of whether punitive damages may
be awarded under the ACAA, however, this court, too, simply
held that the plaintiff had failed to allege or prove facts that
would support an award of punitive damages. While the ACAA
is, itself, silent on the issue of punitive damages, and presently
no case allows punitive damages under the ACAA, it appears
56 Am. Disabled for Accessible Public Transp. v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., 762 F.
Supp. 320, 326-27 (D. Utah 1991).
57 Shinault v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 936 F.2d 796, 805 (5th Cir. 1991).
58 Rivera v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. Civ.-A 96-CV-1130, 1997 WL 634500 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 26, 1997).
59 Id. at *7.
60 Price v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Vt. 1998).
61 Id. at 238 (citing Nadar v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 549 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), revd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976)).
62 DeGirolamo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 159 F. Supp. 2d 764 (D.N.J.
2001).
63 Id. at 769.
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that the test, when ultimately reached, will be whether punitive
damages are "necessary and appropriate" remedies in order to
fulfill the intent of the statute.64
With respect to attorney's fees as damages recoverable under
the ACAA, almost no authority exists. What little authority there
is, clearly states that attorney's fees are not recoverable. 65 In Ri-
vera v. City of Philadelphia,6 6 the court found that Congress has
reserved to itself the policy decision regarding whether attor-
ney's fees can be recovered. Congress declined to address the
issue, therefore attorney's fees are not recoverable by the pre-
vailing party under the ACAA.6 7
The final remedy to discuss is injunctive relief. In Shinault,
the district court denied injunctive relief under the doctrine of
primaryjurisdiction.68 The Fifth Circuit defines that doctrine as
follows:
When legal disputes develop that directly affect an industry sub-
ject to regulation, the need arises to integrate the regulatory
agency into the judicial decision making process. One method
to accomplish integration is to have an agency pass in the first
instance on those issues that are within its competence. In short,
the agency should have the first word.6 9
While noting that this opinion did not constitute a "blanket
proscription on judicially issued injunctions under the ACAA,"
the court nonetheless declined to address any prospective relief,
leaving that to the Department of Transportation. 70
Other courts have not followed the Fifth Circuit's lead in this
regard. In Rowley v. American Airlines, Inc., the Oregon district
court held that the Department of Transportation did not have
primary jurisdiction over a disabled passenger's claim against
American Airlines for injunctive relief under the ACAA. 1l Jan
Rowley was a person with impaired mobility. She alleged that:
the air carrier failed to provide her with an aisle chair; she was
not given adequate assistance; her seat had no moveable arm-
64 See Shinault v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 936 F.2d 796, 804 (5th Cir. 1991).
65 Rivera v. City of Philadelphia, No. Civ.-A 97-CV-1 130, 1998 WL 67538, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1998).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Shinault, 936 F.2d at 804-05.
69 Id. (citing Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line, 532 F.2d 412,
417 (5th Cir. 1976)).
70 Id. at 805.
71 Rowley v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 708, 714 (D. Or. 1995).
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rest; and she was left unattended for more than an hour in a
chair from which she was not independently mobile.7 2 Al-
though the opinion clearly states that she sought injunctive re-
lief under the ACAA, it does not indicate what particular sort of
injunctive relief she sought. Nonetheless, the Oregon district
court took a different tactic with respect to the doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction. It chose to follow a Ninth Circuit opinion
that stated:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction "is concerned with promot-
ing proper relationships between the courts and administrative
agencies charged with particular regulatory duties." It "comes
into play whenever Uudicial] enforcement of the claim requires
the resolution of issues which . . . have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body." In deciding
whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case, courts should
be guided by two principles: the importance of uniformity of reg-
ulation and the need for specialized knowledge. We hold that
no purpose would be served by invoking the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction in this case. By promulgating and periodically revis-
ing a general rule, the Commission has applied its special exper-
tise to the problem of terminal areas and has insured uniformity
in the regulations of terminal area services. The district court's
application of the general rule to the facts of this case was a
mechanical act, requiring no special administrative expertise.
73
Following that rule, the court in Rowley found that because
the Department of Transportation had promulgated regulations
applicable to the case (14 C.F.R. § 382.1) injunctive relief would
be an appropriate judicial remedy. 4
In the case of Gottlieb v. American Airlines, Inc.,75 the Penn-
sylvania district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss
under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Plaintiff Gottlieb al-
leged violations of the ACAA and specific regulations promul-
gated thereunder.76 Distinguishing Shinault, where the court
based part of its decision on the fact that the plaintiff was un-
likely to encounter the same circumstances again, this court
noted that Gottlieb was arguing that he might encounter the
same circumstances again. In the final analysis, the court rea-
72 Id. at 710.
73 Id. at 713-14 (quoting Transway Corp. v. Hawaiian Express Serv., Inc., 679
F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1982)).
74 Id. at 714.
75 Gottlieb v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. Civ. A 94-4933, 1995 WL 41345 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 2, 1995).
76 Id. at *2.
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soned that it would not apply the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion because it was "unable to conclude that the Plaintiff can
prove no set of facts that could entitle him to injunctive relief of
a type that does not intrude upon the agency's expertise or dis-
rupt the agency's regulatory scheme."77 Injunctive relief will be
addressed by the court, or deferred to allow the DOT to act, on
a case-by-case basis.
VII. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACAA
The impact of the ACAA is not confined to civil litigation. Its
impact may be as great or greater in the administrative environ-
ment of enforcement proceedings conducted by the Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT). Enforcement proceedings
result from both independent investigations conducted by the
DOT and as a result of formal complaints filed by citizens.7 En-
forcement proceedings may result in injunctions and civil penal-
ties (fines). The published DOT orders contain more examples
of complaints that were dismissed, for a variety of reasons, than
examples of sanctions. When the DOT does sanction an air car-
rier, however, the sanctions may be significant. The following
paragraphs discuss complaints that were dismissed, followed by a
discussion of complaints and investigations that resulted in
sanctions.79
The first example of an order of dismissal under the regula-
tions implementing the ACAA resulted from the formal com-
plaint lodged by a Mr. Robert Greenberg against American
Airlines. ° In that complaint, Mr. Greenberg contended that he
was discriminated against, citing 14 C.F.R. § 382.3(c), when the
airline refused to allow him to sit in an emergency exit row be-
cause of his blindness. The DOT had already established a pol-
icy of not instituting enforcement actions when airlines refused
to seat blind passengers in exit row seats. Finding that the air-
77 Id.; See generally Am. Disabled for Accessible Public Transp. v. SkyWest Air-
lines, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 320, 327 (D. Utah 1991).
78 See generally Greenberg v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 45335, 1988 WL 239227
(D.O.T. Sept. 16, 1998); 14 C.F.R. § 302.201 (2002).
79 While foreign carriers may not fall within the ambit of the regulations
promulgated to implement the ACAA, similar treatment and sanctions may be
visited on foreign air carriers pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 41310. See Lufthansa Ger-
man Airlines Violation, Consent Order No. 98-9-23, 1998 WL 652072 (D.O.T.
Sept. 23, 1998); Alitalia Violation, Consent Order No. 98-12-19, 1998 WL 865086
(D.O.T. Dec. 15, 1998).
80 Greenberg, 1988 WL 239227, at *6.
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lines' policy, in this situation, was consistent with the Federal
Aviation Administration's own Advisory Circular 120-32 issued
on March 3, 1977, the DOT dismissed Mr. Greenberg's "Third
Party Complaint."'"
Joseph Sontag and Nancy Kruger filed a complaint against
Simmons Airlines, Inc. alleging a violation of section 382.14(b).
These individuals were legally blind. They were upset because
the airline did not allow them to keep long, white flexible canes
with them at their seats. Section 382.14(b) requires carriers to
permit passengers to keep their canes near them so long as it
can be done in a safe manner. The DOT reviewed these particu-
lar complaints and concluded that because of the configuration
of the particular aircraft, in this instance a Shorts 360, the canes
could not be safely stowed as requested by the passengers. It was
not possible to safely stow the canes underneath their seats, ei-
ther perpendicular to the aisle or parallel to the aisle and the
canes could not have been safely placed between the seats and
the fuselage. Accordingly, the DOT found that an airline could
require a passenger's cane to be stored overhead, over the pas-
senger's objection, in the Shorts 360 aircraft.8 2
Norberta Vasquez lodged a formal complaint against South-
west Airlines Company when she was refused boarding, unac-
companied, on a flight. She used a wheelchair and suffered
from cerebral palsy. Ms. Vasquez's story directly contradicted
the testimony of the Southwest Airlines employees. The dispute
involved the information given to, or not given to, the airline
employees who concluded that Ms. Vasquez was not sufficiently
able to assist herself. The airline had safety concerns, on which
it was forced to act at the gate. The DOT defined the problem
as a question of whether Ms. Vasquez was a "qualified handi-
capped person" because there was a fact question as to whether
she was "able to comply with reasonable requests of airline per-
sonnel." Partly because of the great discrepancy between the
testimony of the interested parties, the DOT determined that it
was "not in the public interest" to pursue an enforcement ac-
tion. The complaint was dismissed.83
While attempting to board a Southwest Airlines flight on Jan-
uary 28, 1993 as a standby passenger, Kathy Hacker perceived
81 Id.
82 Sontag v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., No. 45316, 1989 WL 255671, at *1 (D.O.T.
Feb. 3, 1989).
83 Id. at *4; Vasquez v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. 45974, 1989 WL 255895, at
*6 (D.O.T. June 9, 1989).
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that she was not boarded because she was confined to a wheel-
chair. The airline, on the other hand, indicated that a number
of standby passengers, including Ms. Hacker, were not accom-
modated because it was necessary to close the doors to achieve
an on time departure. While the DOT indicated that it might
well violate section 382.7(a) (3) if an airline gave preference to
an ambulatory standby passenger over a wheelchair-bound
standby passenger, there was no clear evidence that this had
taken place.84 The order also dismissed a claimed violation of
section 382.65(a) (5) (iii). That alleged violation involved the
carrier's obligation to provide a Complaint Resolution Officer
(CRO) pursuant to the terms of the regulations. The regula-
tions require the airline to have, located at the airport and avail-
able, a person knowledgeable to address issues raised by
handicapped individuals. That group of regulations also con-
tains additional requirements to respond to a complaint in writ-
ing within a particular period of time and in a particular
manner. The DOT did not take action against the airline in this
circumstance because the airline had been in contact with Ms.
Hacker in some form, if not exactly in the form prescribed by
the regulations, and because the airline did not have a history of
similar violations.85
Adam and Juliana Seligman both have Tourette's syndrome.
When they sought to fly on a Northwest Airlines flight on April
26, 1994, they came to the airport early, requested special seat-
ing, and made efforts to inform the airline about their condition
and otherwise smooth the process of flying with that airline.
When their situation was brought to the attention of the captain
and the crew, the captain obtained limited information, in the
short time available, and the captain directed the customer ser-
vice supervisor to remove the Seligmans from the aircraft. In
the terminal, the situation was further discussed and they were
re-boarded during the general boarding process. Their com-
plaint was that they were not treated properly and that it was
improper for the captain to question them concerning their
condition. In its order of dismissal, the DOT specifically sanc-
tioned the captain's "brief investigation into whether particular
passengers with Tourette's syndrome present real safety con-
84 Hacker v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. 48625, 1993 WL 393372, at *2 (D.O.T.
Oct. 5, 1993).
85 Id. at *3.
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cerns." 86 The order expressly finds no violation of section 382.7
(general prohibition against discrimination) and no violation of
section 382.31 (refusal of transportation).87
A case was dismissed against American Airlines, Inc., where
the complainant alleged that allowing smoking in the Admirals
Club violated a passenger's rights because he was hypersensitive
to environmental tobacco smoke.8  The allegation had been
founded on the general prohibition against discrimination
found in section 382.7. Since the DOT had never banned smok-
ing at airports and specifically permitted smoking on interna-
tional flights, Mr. Williams' complaint was dismissed.89
The same Mr. Williams, now with a companion, Patricia L.
Young, later sought a revocation of Delta's air carrier certificate
on the same basic theory he previously alleged against American
Airlines. This time, he alleged that allowing smoking at airport
facilities rendered those facilities inaccessible to people who
were hypersensitive to tobacco smoke. The result in this case
was the same: dismissal of the complaint.90
Possibly more instructive, are the published orders in which
the DOT has sanctioned various air carriers in the process of
enforcing the ACAA. Almost all of the orders containing a sanc-
tion begin by ordering the airline to cease and desist from any
further violations of the regulation at issue. Additionally, the
DOT has the power to assess a fine of $1,100 as a civil penalty for
each infraction. 91 Also, a formal complaint lodged by a citizen,
or a series of such complaints, may lead the DOT to initiate its
own formal investigation, which in turn may lead to further civil
penalties. Thus, the published orders imply that the airlines
have had the greatest difficulty in complying with the ACAA in
its regulation of the treatment of wheelchair-bound passengers.
John D. Del Colle alleged violations of sections 382.21 and
382.61 for failure to provide a reservation system capable of as-
signing seats with moveable armrests and failure to adequately
train employees charged with accommodating the needs of
86 Seligman v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., No. 49532, 1994 WL 716691, at *3
(D.O.T. Dec. 28, 1994).
87 Id.
88 Williams v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 49692, 1994 WL 716681, at *1 (D.O.T.
Dec. 28, 1994).
89 Id. at *4.
90 Williams v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. OST 2000-7891, 2001 WL 273258, at *3
(D.O.T. Mar. 12, 2001).
91 49 U.S.C. § 46301 (2000); 14 C.F.R. § 383 (2002).
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handicapped individuals. Mr. Del Colle was a wheelchair user.
He had experienced one particular airline's failure to efficiently
identify and assign to him a seat with a removable armrest in
violation of section 382.45. While the DOT fined the airline
$3,000, it appears that the fine was small because the airline had
already installed a computerized system which allowed for the
identification and assignment of seats with moveable armrests. 2
Another airline was fined $25,000 when it failed to provide
prompt assistance to wheelchair passengers within its terminal
facilities. The airline was found to have violated sections 382.31,
382.39, 382.41, 382.43, 382.45, 382.53, 382.61, and 382.65. The
airline had responded by spending large amounts of money to
improve its services to disabled passengers. It also purchased
additional wheelchairs and took other steps to rectify the situa-
tion. Of the $25,000 fine, the order expressly allowed the air-
line to offset $15,000 of the fine by using that money to
purchase larger wheelchairs with adjustable armrests. 3
Arthur Moody complained that a particular airline had vio-
lated several regulations involving treatment of wheelchair trav-
elers. Part of his complaint was that the wheelchairs provided
did not have hand rims, allowing the occupant to be self-pro-
pelled. The result was that a wheelchair traveler could be
stranded in the sense that he could be left unattended in a
wheelchair in which he is not independently mobile for more
than thirty minutes in the gate area. He also alleged that the
airline failed to make a Complaint Resolution Officer available
and failed to provide a timely written response to his com-
plaints. Ultimately, this airline, too, was fined $25,000, of which
$15,000 could be offset by purchase of wheelchairs. This deci-
sion involved violations of sections 382.39(a) (1) and (a) (3). 9'
Sherry Layne traveled with a guide dog due to her blindness.
A problem developed when the passenger next to her refused to
sit next to a dog. The airline resolved the issue by moving Ms.
Layne and her dog from her first class seat to a coach seat where
the neighboring passengers did not object. The airline was
fined $1,000 for violation of section 382.55. The order offers
92 Del Colie v. Continental Airlines, No. 49619, 1994 WL 716698, at *2 (D.O.T.
Dec. 28, 1994).
q3 Am. Airlines, Inc. Violations, No. 95-9-1, 1995 WL 518759 (D.O.T. Sept. 1,
1995).
94 Moody v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 49744, 1995 W 644268, at *5 (D.O.T.
Nov. 3, 1995).
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the following practical advice for handling this problem if it
arises in the future:
If another passenger objects to the presence of a service animal,
the carrier is obliged to advise that passenger of the rights of the
disabled traveler and, if necessary, find an alternative seat for the
objecting passenger or remove that person from the aircraft.9 5
Wheelchair passengers are entitled to be treated just like am-
bulatory passengers when going through the security screening
process. At Dulles International Airport, disabled travelers com-
plained when they were required to be subjected to a private
screening simply because they were in a wheelchair. Even
though the airline was fulfilling its security screening function
through an independent contractor, it was the airline that was
subject to a $50,000 fine, even though evidence was presented to
the effect that many wheelchair passengers in the past had re-
quested private screening. The order indicated that it would be
permissible to offer private screening, but impermissible to re-
quire private screening.96 The airline was found to have violated
section 382.49.17
One airline was fined $50,000 for a series of problems with
handling wheelchair passengers. The problems included viola-
tions of sections 382.39(a), 382.41(e)(2) and 382.65. All of
these violations amounted to violation of the ACAA, resulting in
the $50,000 fine. Another airline was fined $25,000 for violation
of sections 382.41 and 382.65. It was, however, given the oppor-
tunity to offset $10,000 of that penalty through the purchase of
new hydraulic lift boarding chairs for disabled passengers.98
A complaint involving a wheelchair-bound passenger and the
airline's refusal to board him arose when the airline's gate agent
failed to accurately ascertain the passenger's situation with re-
spect to his ability to assist in his own evacuation of the aircraft
should an emergency evacuation be necessary. As it turned out,
the passenger would be qualified to fly unaccompanied, but the
gate agent determined otherwise at the time of the proposed
boarding. This constituted a violation of section 382.35(b) (3).
The airline was fined $5,000 with an allowance of $2,500 toward
9.5 Layne v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., No. OST-99-5135, 1999 WL 759702, at *2
(D.O.T. Sept. 28, 1999).
96 United Airlines Violation, No. 2000-1-5, 2000 WL 4959, at *2 (D.O.T. Jan. 5,
2000).
97 Id.
98 Maxwell v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. OST-00-7591, 2001 WL 109519, at *3
(D.O.T. Feb. 7, 2001).
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the purchase of new wheelchairs or similar equipment, as a po-
tential set off.99
VIII. DEFENSES TO ACAA CLAIMS GENERALLY
Successful defenses to claims of discrimination under the
ACAA fall in two general categories. Defendants can appropri-
ately avoid liability if the circumstances at issue do not fall within
the regulations. Additionally, within the regulations, a defen-
dant can avoid compliance if it would compromise safety.
In some cases, the defense was raised that the plaintiff was not
a qualified handicapped individual entitled to the benefits of
the statute. 100 Another "definitional" sort of defense can be in-
terposed if the defendant is not an air carrier or is not an air
carrier subject to the provisions of this statute. 10' Similarly, if
the offensive behavior is not discriminatory the carrier may
avoid liability.'0 2 Furthermore, the Warsaw Convention, when it
applies, can preempt the ACAA.'O3
The regulations expressly authorize allowing an airline to re-
fuse to transport any person on the basis of safety, including
both safety of flight'0 4 and the passenger's own safety.'0 5 If this
authority is properly exercised, the airline may refuse transpor-
99 At. Southeast Airlines Violation, No. 2001- 8-17, 2001 WL 987943 (D.O.T.
Aug. 21, 2001).
oo See Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 206 (6th Cir. 1996), remanded,
156 F. Supp. 2d 678 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (whether a disabled employee can be a
qualified individual); Squire v. United Airlines, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (D.
Colo. 1997) (whether the ACAA protects job applicants as well as fare paying
passengers/customers); Tall Club of Silicon Valley v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2000 WL
868524, at *2 (N.D. Cal.June 19, 2000) (whether extreme height can be a qualify-
ing disability).
101 See Bower, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 689 (whether FedEx is exempt by reason of an
express exemption); Wilson v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 94 C 5411, 1995 WL
530653, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1995) (whether the ACAA applies to ground
service providers); see also United Airlines Violation, Order 2000-1-5, 2000 WL
4959, at *2 (D.O.T. Jan. 5, 2000) (fining the airline and not its contractor for
security screening violations).
102 Deterra v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 298, 312 (D. Mass. 2002).
103 Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Brandt v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. C 98-208951, 2000 WL 288393, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 13, 2000).
104 14 C.F.R. § 382.31(d) (2002); 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2002); see Price v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 226, 223 (D. Vt. 1998).
105 14 C.F.R. § 382.53(b) (2) (2002); Newman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 176 F.3d
1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998).
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tation to a qualified disabled passenger without violating the
regulations. 106
It should also be noted that these regulations do not establish
strict liability.10 7 While an unreasonable delay in providing re-
quired services may be a violation of the regulations, it is a per-
fectly good defense to show that the delay was reasonable.10 8
This concept applies most frequently and most aptly to the pro-
vision of wheelchair services to handicapped passengers. Simi-
larly, the standard concept of "proximate cause" can come into
play. If a delay in provision of services, or a failure to provide
services, is in no way the proximate cause of a plaintiffs injuries,
the alleged failure to comply with the regulations will not lead
inevitably to liability.'0 9
The defenses of "statute of limitations" and pre-emption ad-
dressed by the Warsaw Convention are discussed in more detail
in the next two sections.
IX. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSES IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE ACAA
In the civil litigation arena, some plaintiffs have found their
claims time barred. Sadie Pearl Vaughn sued Northwest Air-
lines, Inc. because of the way she was treated on October 11,
1992. She suffered from fibromyalgia, a connective tissue disor-
der. She came to the airport with a suitcase, box, garment bag,
purse satchel, and a paper bag containing her coat and um-
brella. She notified Northwest that she was under a doctor's
care and requested assistance with her baggage. Northwest al-
legedly told her that unless she paid a $45 fee, she would have to
carry one of the items on board with her. She was not able to
make the payment. In the process of carrying and stowing her
baggage, she asserts that she "injured her back, chest, neck, arm,
hand, and right shoulder and permanently injured her left
106 14 C.F.R. § 382.31(d) (2002); Price, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 233; Greenberg v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., No. 45335, 1988 WL 239227, at *5 (D.O.T. Sept. 16, 1998). See
generally Anderson v. USAIR, Inc., 818 F.2d 49, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
107 Adiutori v. Sky Harbor Int'l Airport, 880 F. Supp. 696, 701 (D. Ariz. 1995)
("The Court finds that the plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing a viola-
tion of ACAA, which the Court notes is not a strict liability statute, based upon his
argument that he had to wait for a wheelchair after deplaning the America West
flight.").
108 Id.
109 Id. at 703; Glatfelter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 558 S.E.2d 793, 797 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2002).
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shoulder."'1 ° Exactly two years later Vaughn filed suit, alleging
discrimination under the ACAA.11
The Minnesota Supreme Court found no limitations provi-
sion provided by Congress with respect to Vaughn's ACAA
claim. It sought, then, to find the most closely analogous or ap-
propriate limitations period under the law of the forum state.
Selection of the state limitations period was held to be a matter
of federal law, but the court held that state law governed the
length of the selected limitations period. Finding that the Min-
nesota Human Rights Act contained the most analogous cause
of action in Minnesota state law, the court applied its one-year
statute of limitations. In a lengthy discussion, the court distin-
guished other situations in which various courts have applied a
state's residual statute of limitations for personal injuries. Based
on this reasoning, the Supreme Court of Minnesota dismissed
Vaughn's case as untimely.
112
In Squire v. United Airlines, Inc.,"' various job applicants al-
leged that the air carrier's refusal to hire them as flight officers
due to radial keratotomy eye surgery violated the ACAA. That
court, too, looked for the most analogous state statute of limita-
tions, finding that "on April 15, 1986, the Colorado statute of
limitations for claims based on federal statutes was two years and
the 'residuary' statute of limitations for which no cause of action
was specified was three years." ' 14 Two of the three plaintiffs
filed their complaints at least seven years after the claims had
accrued. So, without deciding which statute of limitations to
employ, the court found that these plaintiffs' claims were time
barred." 5
110 Vaughn v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn. 1997).
111 Id. This opinion is also of interest for its in-depth discussion of the quan-
tum of duty owed to a disabled person by an air carrier. The court finds that an
air carrier must use reasonable care to provide additional services to a disabled
person if the carrier is made aware of the disability and the need for special
assistance, and can foresee the harm that might result from lack of assistance.
The court does not hold the air carrier to a higher standard of care, but rather
requires the air carrier to provide additional services, contrary to the report of at
least one commentator. See Erin M. Kinahan, Despite the ACAA, Turbulence Is Not
Just In the Sky for Disabled Travelers, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 397 (Winter-
Spring 2001).
112 Vaughn, 558 N.W.2d at 742.
113 Squire v. United Airlines, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (D. Colo. 1997).
114 Id. at 1007.
115 Id. at 1007-08.
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Based on the Vaughn case, it would appear that various stat-
utes of limitations may apply in a given case. No general rule
can be stated regarding the amount of time available for filing a
claim under the ACAA. The amount of time available will de-
pend on the forum state's law and which particular law the court
finds most analogous to the ACAA.
X. PRE-EMPTION OF THE ACAA BY THE
WARSAW CONVENTION
An additional defense may arise where claims under the
ACAA appear destined to be pre-empted any time a case falls
within the parameters of the Warsaw Convention.'1 6
Sidney Brandt boarded a flight from Dallas, Texas to San
Francisco, California. It was the last leg on his trip from Winni-
peg, Canada to San Francisco, via Calgary and Dallas. He suf-
fered from myasthenia gravis, a condition causing unusual
muscle weakness, slow movement, and the need to take medica-
tion that must be consumed with food. On this leg, the flight
did not provide snacks or any food to coach passengers. After
explaining his medical need, he was still denied food by the
flight crew. The flight crew also denied him the opportunity to
deplane in order to get food while the aircraft was at the gate.
Ultimately, the plaintiff deplaned in order to avoid being ar-
rested for causing a disturbance." 7 After reviewing the various
elements that bring a case within the Warsaw Convention, the
court addressed the issue of whether plaintiffs ACAA claims
were pre-empted by the Warsaw Convention. Following the case
of El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng,"' which held that the Warsaw
Convention pre-empted local law claims even when the plaintiff
could not establish liability under the Warsaw Convention, the
court in Brandt v. American Airlines"9 concluded that federal dis-
crimination claims under the ACAA were also pre-empted.
116 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 40105 (West 2001) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention]. "Warsaw Convention" here refers to the original convention and
all subsequent modifications.
117 Brandt v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. C 98-2089 SI, 2000 WL 288393, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 13, 2000).
118 El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
119 Brandt, 2000 WL 28393, at *4.
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In the Turturrow v. Continental Airlines12 ° case, the Southern
District of New York faced problems arising from another pas-
senger's difficulties with medication. Joan Turturrow was under
the treatment of a doctor who prescribed Xanax for anxiety.
This medication was particularly important since she had a long-
standing fear of flying. While waiting to board an international
flight, her purse was stolen. She later discovered that her Xanax
had been in the stolen purse, forcing her to face the 5-1/2 hour
flight without medication. She then asked to be deplaned. Af-
ter her requests met with repeated refusals, she used her cell
phone to call "911." The aircraft was ultimately stopped and she
was deplaned. She sought recovery under the ACAA, in addi-
tion to other theories. Since it was an international flight, from
Newark to Costa Rica, the Warsaw Convention applied. While
most of the court's effort was devoted to determining that she
could not recover under the Warsaw Convention, the court also
concluded that the plaintiffs ACAA claims were pre-empted.
121
The court reached its result in spite of the fact that the Wendell
H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the Twenty-
First Century, 122 had just extended the application of the ACAA
to foreign carriers. The court holds that the ACAA functions
"subject to bilateral obligations" such as the Warsaw
Convention. 23
XI. PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS BY THE ACAA
Pre-emption has been raised in a variety of different fashions
relating to the ACAA. It can be the focus of legal analysis if the
ACAA is pre-empted by the Warsaw Convention as discussed
above; it can also be at issue if the ACAA pre-empts state law
claims. Following passage of the ACAA, defendants argued that
the ACAA pre-empted state law tort claims arising out the same
occurrence giving rise to the ACAA claim.
In Williams v. Express Airlines I, Inc.,124 the plaintiff alleged that
he was falsely imprisoned when he was stopped from boarding a
flight on which he had a reserved seat. He also made a separate
allegation against another defendant, Northwest Airlines, for
having strapped him into an immobile aisle chair, leaving him
120 Turturrow v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
121 Id. at 180.
122 Pub. L. 106-181, Apr. 5, 2000, 114 Stat. 61 (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 41705(a)).
123 Id.
124 Williams v. Express Airlines I, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 831 (W.D. Tenn. 1993).
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unattended for over thirty minutes in the gate area. He sued
both airlines under the ACAA, and also sought to prosecute
state tort law false imprisonment claims. Although the court's
decision was actually based on pre-emption by the ADA, the
ACAA played a part in its reasoning. The court initially denied
any pre-emption, but following the United States Supreme
Court decision in Morales v. Transworld Airlines, Inc.,125 the court
reconsidered. The ADA does, of course, contain an express pre-
emption. That statute states: "(N)o State... shall enact or en-
force any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision, hav-
ing the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or
services of any air carrier .... 1 26 Following Morales, and its reli-
ance on ERISA cases, this court had little trouble concluding
that the plaintiff's false imprisonment claims "relate [d] to" air-
line "rates, routes, or services." In reaching that conclusion, it
further pointed out that "the conduct complained of in both the
false imprisonment and ACAA discrimination claims is essen-
tially the same."' 27 Given that context, the court stated that the
occurrence fell squarely within the ACAA. That being the case,
this court held that the federal law pre-empted the state law
claims.
In Rowley v. American Airlines,1 28 the plaintiff was a wheelchair-
bound passenger who alleged that the air carrier failed to pro-
vide her with an aisle chair; she was not assisted to and from her
seat; her seat did not have immovable arm rests; and she was left
unattended at a baggage claim area for more than an hour in a
chair from which she was not independently mobile. 129 She al-
leged both claims under the ACAA and state law tort claims for
infliction of emotional distress. The defendant countered by ar-
guing that the plaintiff's state law tort claims were pre-empted
first by the ADA, and then, by the ACAA. This court, like the
Williams court, looked to Morales for guidance in deciding the
case. Employing a more detailed analysis than that contained in
Williams, the court concluded:
If to allow the tort claims advanced by Rowley under the laws of
the States of Oregon and Texas would contravene the goals of
125 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
126 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1), repealed, current version at 49 U.S.C. § 41713
(2000).
127 Williams, 825 F. Supp. at 833.
128 Rowley v. Am. Airlines Inc., 875 F. Supp. 708 (D. Or. 1995); see also Rowley
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Or. 1995).
129 Rowley, 875 F. Supp. at 710.
20031
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
deregulation or penalize airlines for practices which are accepted
forms of price competition and reduction, they are pre-empted
by § 1305 of the ADA. However, if Rowley's state law tort claims
do not have a significant impact on the ability of an airline to
administer services, the state law tort claims relate too tenuously
to airline services to be pre-empted under § 1305.130
So reasoning, the court concluded that the ADA did not pre-
empt Rowley's state law tort claims.
The defendant then argued that the ACAA pre-empted those
same claims. The court observed that the ACAA has no express
pre-emption language contained within it. Any pre-emption
under the ACAA must be implied pre-emption. The implied
pre-emption, if any, arises from the ADA. Having already de-
cided that the ADA did not pre-empt Rowley's state law tort
claims, the court concluded that the ACAA did not pre-empt
her state law tort claims.' 3 1
After the Rowley decision was handed down, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue, again, in the case of Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens.11 2 That case involved a state court
challenge to the retroactive changes implemented by the airline
with respect to the terms and conditions of its frequent flyer
program. The court held that the ADA does not pre-empt state
court actions to enforce private contract rights. 3' Courts ad-
dressing the pre-emption issue relating to the ACAA and the
ADA have tended to look to these two United States Supreme
Court decisions in Morales and Wolens for guidance.
In the case of Knopp v. American Airlines, Inc.,"' the Supreme
Court of Tennessee rendered an opinion concerning pre-emp-
tion under the ADA. Phyllis Knopp did not receive a requested
wheelchair transfer. She then fell from an electric cart used in-
stead of a wheelchair to transport her. She sued in state court
on breach of contract and negligence theories and the airline
raised pre-emption under the ADA as a defense. Following
Morales and Wolens, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that
Knopp's claims were not pre-empted. 135
130 Id. at 712.
131 Id. at 713; see also Newman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 176 F.3d 1128, 1130-31 (9th
Cir. 1999).
132 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
133 Id. at 220.
134 Knopp v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. 1996).
135 Id. at 363.
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In Rivera v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,'3 6 three passengers ticketed by
Delta all requested wheelchair assistance, which they did not re-
ceive. Rivera alleged that she tripped and fell as a result of not
having wheelchair assistance, leading to personal injury claims,
while the two other ladies made only discrimination claims, in-
cluding claims under the ACAA. The federal district court
points out the fact that the lower courts are split on their inter-
pretation of the pre-emption issue. After considering and dis-
cussing a great many of the cases mentioned herein, the court
ultimately concluded that the negligence claims are not pre-
empted by the ADA or the ACAA.1
37
The Ninth Circuit addressed these issues in the case of New-
man v. American Airlines, Inc.13" Elizabeth Newman was blind and
suffered from a heart condition. On a return flight, the airline
refused her a seat until she could provide a doctor's certificate
approving the flight. She brought suit under the ACAA as well
as state tort law. The district court, finding that the ADA pre-
empted her state law tort claims, granted the airline's motion
for summary judgment both as to her ACAA claims and her
breach of contract claim. The Circuit Court relied on its own en
banc decision in Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,'39 in revers-
ing the trial court on the pre-emption issue. Indeed, the Circuit
Court reversed the trial court on all issues and remanded the
case for further handling.1
40
In Price v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,'41 the Vermont district court
held that state law tort claims were not pre-empted by the ADA.
Gregory Price boarded a flight from Burlington, Vermont des-
tined for Miami, Florida with two intermediate stops. Gregory
Price was suffering from AIDS and had Kaposi's sarcoma, which
caused ulcerated and infected lesions on his legs, which, if not
constantly dressed, would emit a foul odor. Ultimately, he was
involuntarily deplaned because the flight attendants and passen-
gers were becoming sick and nauseated as a result of the odor.
After he succumbed to his disease, his executrix, seeking recov-
ery under the ACAA in addition to various state law tort claims,
136 Rivera v. City of Philadelphia, No. Civ.-A 97-CV-1130, 1998 WL 67538, at *6
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1998).
137 Id.
138 Newman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 176 F.3d 1128, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1998).
139 Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998) (en
banc).
14 Newman, 176 F.3d at 1132.
141 Price v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 226, 236-37 (D. Vt. 1998).
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filed the lawsuit. The district court allowed the ACAA claims to
proceed along with the state law tort claims, finding no pre-emp-
tion. The court relied on Morales and Wolens as primary gui-
dance in reaching its conclusion. 14 2
Similarly, another district court in the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed the pre-emption issue in Tall Club of Silicon Valley v.
American Airlines, already discussed above. In that case, the Tall
Club did not allege any violation of the ACAA or the ADA, but
the defendants claimed that those statutes pre-empted the plain-
tiffs request for an injunction requiring the provision of seats
with added legroom for tall people. 4 ' Following the authority
discussed above, the court held: "Because complete federal pre-
emption is so selective and because disability and personal in-
jury are so tenuously related to rates, routes, and service under
the ADA, plaintiff should be allowed to return to state court and
attempt to litigate its claims in that forum.' 1 44 While none of
the courts have been willing to form a general rule, it seems
apparent that preemption of state law claims by the ADA and
the ACAA will continue to be handled on a case-by-case basis. 4 '
At the same time, it seems clear that private contract issues will
not be pre-empted by the ADA or the ACAA.
XII. APPLICATION OF THE ACAA TO ALL-
CARGO CARRIERS
The Sixth Circuit has concluded that an all-cargo carrier fits
the definition of "air carrier" within the meaning of the ACAA,
bringing all-cargo carriers within the ambit of the ACAA.' 4 6 In
the Bower v. Federal Express Corp. case, a plaintiff was denied
jumpseat privileges due to his use of crutches and leg braces.
The court was presented with the question of whether this ad-
mittedly disabled person fit within the ACAA in light of the fact
that Federal Express was not an "air carrier" in the sense of
transporting passengers as its business. At that time, the ACAA
defined "air carrier" as "a citizen of the United States undertak-
ing by any means, directly or indirectly, to provide air transpor-
142 Id. at 235.
143 Tall Club of Silicon Valley v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2000 WL 868524, at *2
(N.D. Cal. June 19, 2000).
144 Id. at *6.
145 See DeTerra v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277-78 (D. Mass.
2002).
146 Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 205-06 (6th Cir. 1996).
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tation. ' ' 14 7  The definition of "air transportation" in turn
includes "the transportation of passengers or property by air-
craft."' 4 8 Since Federal Express transports property, the court
concluded that it is an "air carrier" for purposes of the ACAA.
This conclusion was supported by four additional factors: (1)
under the previous version of the applicable statute, the same
result would be reached since the revision was only a recodifica-
tion without the intent to make any substantive change; (2) even
though the Secretary of the DOT had the authority to exempt
Federal Express from section 41705 by the issuance of a certifi-
cate under 49 U.S.C. § 41103(d)(1)(B), the Secretary had not
chosen to do so; (3) Federal Express does have to comply with
certain safety requirements promulgated by the Federal Aviation
Administration when carrying passengers; and (4) other Federal
Aviation regulations apply to non-revenue passengers.149
This holding, while not overruled or reversed, may no longer
reflect the actual state of affairs with respect to Federal Express
due to the reasoning raised by the district court on remand. 150
In that opinion, the court notes that an all-cargo carrier can be
exempt from the ACAA pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 291.31 (1997).
It reads as follows:
Each section 41102 or 41103 air carrier providing cargo opera-
tions and interstate air transportation is, with respect to such
transportation, exempted from the following portions of the Stat-
ute only if and so long as it complies with the provisions of this
part and the conditions imposed herein, and to the extent necessary
to permit it to conduct cargo operations in interstate air transportation:
(1) Sections 41310, 41705.151
The district court, then, placed the burden on Federal Ex-
press to prove that it fell within the parameters of this regula-
tion.152 The ACAA, in the final analysis, may or may not apply to
an all-cargo air carrier, depending on the extent to which it has
complied with the provisions of Part 291.
147 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (2000).
148 49 U.S.C. §§ 40102(a) (23), (25) (2000) (emphasis added).
149 Bower, 96 F.3d at 204-06.
150 Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 678, 688 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
'5' Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 291.31 (1997)) (emphasis added).
152 Id. at 689 ("Therefore, to decide whether Defendant is exempt from the
ACAA under section 291.31, the Court must determine which flight deck jump-
seats and supernumerary seats, if any, could be removed without arresting Defen-
dant's ability to conduct its cargo operations in interstate air transportation.").
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XIII. APPLICATION OF THE ACAA TO
FOREIGN CARRIERS
In Alino v. Aerovias De Mexico,'1 3 a disabled resident of Miami,
Florida alleged discriminatory treatment on an Aero Mexico
flight from Cabo San Lucas to Mexico City. The court chose to
apply the newer version of the ACAA that expressly applies to
any foreign air carrier.'54 The court went on, however, to con-
clude that the scope of the ACAA did not include this particular
case. The ACAA applies to a foreign air carrier when it is pro-
viding air transportation.'55 Air transportation is defined as be-
ing between two places within the United States, or between a
place in the United States and a place outside the United States.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the ACAA "does not ap-
ply to a foreign air carrier operating a foreign domestic flight
that does not travel to a place within the United States. 156
In another circumstance, while the foreign air carrier had no
liability, its domestic code-sharing partner was held liable. In
DeGirolamo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane,1 57 the plaintiff was a
wheelchair-bound traveler. He sought to travel from Newark to
Rome on Alitalia. Alitalia refused to sell him a ticket unless he
was accompanied, which in turn would require him to purchase
a second ticket. He was forced to fly with a different carrier,
purchase a more expensive ticket, purchase a ticket for an at-
tendant, and to depart from a less convenient airport. Alitalia
had a code-sharing agreement with Continental Airlines. Pursu-
ant to that agreement, Continental would have flown the flight
in question. All of this took place at a time before the ACAA
had been amended to expressly include foreign air carriers.
Regulations promulgated pursuant to the ACAA expressly pro-
hibited Continental from treating a passenger in the way Mr.
DeGirolamo was treated. Specifically, section 382.7 i 58 prohibits
a regulated air carrier from doing something through a contrac-
tor that it could not do itself. Continental could not have re-
quired a passenger to pay for an attendant if the passenger
153 Alino v. Aerovias De Mexico, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1342-43 (S.D. Fla.
2000).
1-54 Id. at 1344.
155 Id. at 1345 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a)).
156 Id.
157 DeGirolamo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 159 F. Supp. 2d 764 (D.N.J.
2001).
158 14 C.F.R. § 382 (2002).
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believed that he was capable of traveling independently.1 59 The
court found that under the regulations applicable to Alitalia, Al-
italia's "restriction was not 'unreasonable,'" and granted AI-
italia's motion for summary judgment. 6 ° At the same time,
applying the different regulations that applied to Continental,
the court granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
against Continental on the count in the complaint alleging a
violation of the ACAA. 16 This result is notable partly because
Continental never saw or spoke to the plaintiff. Alitalia might
not receive the same treatment today, now that the ACAA has
been amended to expressly apply to foreign air carriers.
16 2
XIV. APPLICATION OF THE ACAA TO NON-AIR-
CARRIER CONTRACTORS
As noted immediately above, a regulated air carrier cannot
avoid liability by delegating some task to an independent con-
tractor. The independent contractor, however, may still be free
from liability imposed by regulation. In Wilson v. United Air-
lines,163 the plaintiff did not receive the wheelchair service she
had requested. She sued the airline, United, and then later
amended her complaint to sue ITS, a wheelchair services pro-
vider employed by United. The plaintiff alleged that ITS was
liable for violating the ACAA. In determining whether ITS falls
within the scope of the ACAA, the Court looked to various defi-
nitions of air carriers and indirect air carriers. While none of
these definitions was contained within the ACAA, they were all
definitions in the context of the Federal Aviation Act. The CAP
used the following definition: "Indirect air carrier" is an "entity
which publicly represents that it engages in air transporta-
tion." "' Four indicia have been identified by various courts to
aide in the definition of an indirect air carrier: "1) an 'indirect
air carrier' holds itself out to the public that it engages in air
transportation; 2) sells flights to the general public; 3) furnishes
159 14 C.F.R. § 382.45(c).
160 DeGirolamo, 159 F. Supp. 2d at 767.
161 Id. at 769.
162 For a discussion of what the future may hold for foreign air carriers under
the ACAA, see Lawrence Mentz, Air Carrier Access Act And Foreign Air Carriers:
"Handicapping" Regulations, 15 AIR & SPACE L. 8 (Fall 2000).
163 Wilson v. United Airlines, No. 94 C 54:1, 1995 WL 530653 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7,
1995).
- Id. at *2 (citing Arkin v. Trans Int'l Airlines, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 11, 13
(E.D.N.Y. 1982)).
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flights otherwise not serviced by regularly scheduled airlines; or
4) solicits members of the general public to purchase tickets on
the flights it arranges. '' 165 None of these approaches recognizes
ITS as an indirect air carrier. Accordingly, the court dismissed
the claim against ITS, holding that it was not subject to the
ACAA. It should be noted, however, that United Airlines was
potentially liable because it could not do indirectly that which
would be a violation if done directly. Furthermore, there was
probably an indemnity agreement between ITS and United.
Once all is said and done, there may be little value to the fact
that ITS was dismissed from the case since the airline may have a
non-delegable duty and the contractor may have agreed to in-
demnify the airline.
XV. ANTICIPATED FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS RELATING
TO THE ACAA
There are presently before Congress bills seeking to create
what has been called a "Passengers Bill of Rights." 166 Each ver-
sion of that proposed legislation addresses the rights of disabled
passengers. Some form of passengers' bill of rights may eventu-
ally be enacted. If that happens, the courts may be forced to
address the question of which statute takes precedence and
whether to construe the two statutory provisions in pari materia.
Given the trend of legislation in the past two decades, it seems
safe to predict that the future will bring increased benefits for
handicapped and disabled passengers created by increasing the
burden on air carriers to provide those accommodations.
165 Id. (citations omitted).
166 Airline Customer Service Act, H.R. 1792, 107th Cong. (1st Session 2001);
Airline Customer Service Act, S. 319, 107th Cong. (1st Session 2001).
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